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Abstract
Immigrant integration is a contested policy field in which boundaries ofmembership are drawn and re-negotiatedwhereby
groups of immigrants are partially included and excluded. Building on the concept of collective identity and theories of
boundary making, this paper illustrates how religion functions as a category to mark and fill notions of self and other-
ness. As several studies have shown, immigrants in Europe are increasingly addressed as Muslims, a development that
also serves the promotion of a Christian ‘us’. Focusing on Austria and Germany, two countries where this is especially ob-
servable, the paper outlines the functioning of religion as symbolic boundary. The empirical study on national integration
policies demonstrates how—within the relational process of boundary drawing against Muslims—a Christian identity nar-
rative is established, how it functions as a marker of unity and how it relates to liberal and secular notions. Results from
the qualitative content analysis of governmental policy programs from 2005 onwards show different patterns of boundary
drawing on religion and the way they shape and limit the possibilities of inclusion. To understand this development, we
have to look at Christian-democratic policy-makers, who currently dominate the political struggle for the power to define
features of collective identity in immigrant integration policies.
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1. Introduction
As shown by various studies, Islam andMuslims have be-
come ‘the other’ in European immigrant integration de-
bates (Allievi, 2005; Grillo, 2010; Modood, 2009). The
literature gives different explanations for the difficulty
European societies experience with the integration of
their Muslim populations. Within a broad spectrum of
approaches, I identify four distinctive lines of argument.
Some authors argue that Europe is essentially Christian,
‘deeply rooted in a Christian tradition’ and that Islam
is therefore problematized in discourses on immigrant
integration (Zolberg & Woon, 1999). In this view, the
conflict comes down to the unwillingness to adapt pre-
dominantly Christian settings to religious pluralism and
the refusal to include another religion into Christian self-
perception. Conversely, other authors argue that Europe
is essentially secular (Cesari, 2009; Foner & Alba, 2008),
in fact the ‘most deeply secularized of all corners of the
globe’ and the ‘real issue in the Islam challenge is a vi-
tally felt religionmeeting a thoroughly non-religious (but
not other-religious) environment’ (Joppke, 2013, p. 611).
This argument sees the Muslim presence (and the reli-
gious demands it might entail) as a challenge to the now
essentially secular Europe. A third argument focuses on
the essentially liberal identity of European states and
the illiberal threat Islam might pose to it (Hansen, 2011).
While similar to the idea of a secular Europe, this line
of argument does not read the presence of a vibrant
religion per se as a problem but the illiberal ideas it is
argued to transmit. A fourth view on the problematiza-
tion and the othering of Islam argues on a meta-level,
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seeing ‘Muslim’ as a racialized category to name a ‘visi-
ble other’ to white Europeans in a ‘colour-blind’ Europe
(El-Tayeb, 2011, p. 16). This way of thinking would view
the three other arguments as proof of the underlying—
essentially racial—boundary at play. All these arguments
have in common that they link the problematization of Is-
lam to the constitution of the European self. This follows
the logic of identity politics in which unity is produced by
pointing out what is ‘not us’. While the portrayal of Mus-
lims and Islam as problematic is common to most Euro-
pean immigrant integration debates, there is less clarity
about the unifying elements of the perceived ‘us’. To put
it bluntly: Are we all Christian, are we all secular, are we
all liberal or are we just white?
Much scholarly attention has been paid to the appli-
cation of ‘Muslim’ as a category of other-identification
in immigrant integration debates and its exclusionary im-
plications, but fewer studies analysed the resulting con-
struction of the ‘us’ that is necessarily implied (valuable
insights can be found in Brubaker, 2010; Eder, 2006; Ko-
rteweg & Yurdakul, 2014). Several authors have noted a
new emphasis on Christianity as one particular aspect
of this ‘us’ in European immigrant integration policies
(Joppke, 2013; Modood, 2012). However, there is little
understanding of this addressing of religion, how it func-
tions as a marker of unity and how it relates to liberal
and secular self-perceptions. The sole focus on the exclu-
sion of an out-group obstructs any understanding of the
underlying controversy over what makes up a collective
identity. Not taking into account the political attempts to
shape these perceptions, ignores ongoing power strug-
gles over who ‘we’ are and what might or might not be
in ‘our’ interest.
On that score, this paper focuses on the ways in
which religion is involved in collective identities articu-
lated in the context of immigrant integration. An empir-
ical case study on governmental immigrant integration
policies in Germany and Austria looks at the construc-
tion of symbolic boundaries that draw on religion as a
marker for self and otherness. During the periods of ob-
servation (2005–2009 in Germany, 2008–2013 in Austria)
both countries developed immigrant integration policy
programs at national level, which were predominantly
shaped by Christian-democratic policy makers (CDU/CSU
in Germany, ÖVP in Austria). The analysis shows how
Christianity is related to liberal and secular ideas almost
to the same extent as Islam is assumed to oppose them.
In the relational process of boundary drawing, Muslims
(constructed as a homogenous group) are continuously
portrayed as illiberal in their religious beliefs and prac-
tices while Christianity is constructed as an essential
marker of unity in a variety of ways. Here, Christian-
democratic parties might have found a way to overcome
their struggle to successfully combine a Christian iden-
tity with a liberal democratic setting in increasingly sec-
ular societies. Rather than viewing this new emphasis
on Christianity as a religious conflict, as a response to
multiculturalism or as a sign of liberal disorientation, we
can understand it as an expression of a political ideology
Christian-democratic policy makers foster.
2. Collective Identity and Boundary Making in
Immigrant Integration Policy
Immigrant integration policies produce membership
boundaries through a notion of ‘into what’ immigrant
populations are supposed to be integrated. As many au-
thors have pointed out, it is the very idea of integra-
tion itself that provokes the issue of a common self-
perception (Joppke, 2013; Korteweg & Yurdakul, 2014).
This preoccupation with characteristics of a perceived
unity allows policy makers to create and position nar-
ratives about ‘us’. Consequently, we can understand im-
migrant integration policy debates as ‘negotiations over
how best to craft a shared national identity in a social
context transformed by immigration’ (Korteweg & Tri-
adafilopoulos, 2013, p. 115). National identity mostly re-
volves around the idea of a common past, ancestry and
culture of the people living in a certain territory (Guiber-
nau, 2004, p. 126). Viewing nations as ‘imagined polit-
ical communities’, national identity has to be seen as
a permanent discursive process resulting in a kind of
habitus which people ‘internalize through socialization’
(De Cillia, Reisigl, & Wodak, 1999, p. 153). It would be
a foreshortened view to equate the aspects of identity
promoted within immigrant integration policies with na-
tional identities. They are better understood as collective
self-identifications, which is to ‘identify oneself and oth-
ers at the same time: to speak not just of but for others,
to subsume others, along with oneself, into a collective
“we’’’ (Brubaker, 2013, p. 2).
I use the term collective identity, as the construc-
tion of sameness does not necessarily rely on the no-
tion of nation but mostly promotes a collective identity
that is embedded in the European context as well as
in particular national ones. Complementary to the ‘Eu-
ropeanization of exclusion’, which subsumes the exten-
sively researched othering of Islam across Europe (El-
Tayeb, 2011, p. 23), there might be a Europeanization of
inclusion, which cannot be observed if promoted identi-
ties are analysed as nationally bound.
The promotion of collective identity serves the cre-
ation of a majority, as well as the making of minorities
(Wimmer, 2013), both shaped by the ‘delineation of “us”
and “not us”’ (Zolberg & Woon, 1999, p. 8). Theories
of boundary making view this as a relational process
whereby in-groups and out-groups form around bound-
aries. Scholarship on boundaries covers a multitude of
micro- and macro-social and socio-political categoriza-
tion processes (see Pachucki, Lamont, & Pendergrass,
2007). Interested in how religion becomes a feature of
collective identity, this paper’s focus lies on categoriza-
tion in governmental policy programs as a specific aspect
of symbolic boundary formation.
Symbolic boundaries are ‘conceptual distinctions’ so-
cial actors make to ‘separate people into groups and gen-
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erate feelings of similarity and group membership’ (La-
mont & Molnár, 2002, p. 168). State institutions, such
as governments, are in a dominant position to make
their preferred distinctions ‘politically relevant, publicly
acknowledged and culturally legitimate’ (Wimmer, 2013,
p. 64). In the literature on boundary formation, sym-
bolic boundaries are differentiated from social bound-
aries, which manifest in institutions and limit access
to resources for certain groups (Bail, 2008). While so-
cial boundaries are reinforced and made salient using
discrimination, collective organization and physical vio-
lence, means of symbolic boundary making include sym-
bolic actions and discursive practices.
This paper analyses symbolic boundary formations,
which function along distinct modes. Andreas Wimmer
describes these modes as mostly building on existing
group concepts that might change through processes
of contraction or expansion, transvaluation, positional
moves or boundary blurring (2013, p. 57). Boundaries
shift (contract or expand) when terms for member-
ship and non-membership are redefined, narrowing or
widening the set of accepted attributes. Transvaluation
occurs, when the normative order of a stratified sys-
tem changes. Individual or collective positional moves
might allow boundary crossings. However, bright bound-
aries can only be overcome by giving up distinctive ele-
ments of one’s identity as they require assimilation in its
strictest sense (Alba, 2005) and persist despite individual
crossings (Barth, 1998). When boundaries get blurred by
contrast, the in-group and its structures change. Former
characteristics of the out-group become accepted within
the in-group, the overlapping of previously mutually ex-
clusive identity markers and multiple memberships are
tolerated (Korteweg & Yurdakul, 2014). While especially
Wimmer’smodes of boundarymaking aremore complex
and comprehensive, the general applicability to catego-
rization processes makes theories of boundary making
a useful analytical tool to understand how institutions
shape religion as a notion of difference.
3. Religion and Collective Identity
In terms of the composition of collective identities pro-
moted in European immigrant integration policies, there
is broad agreement on two aspects: First, Muslims have
become ‘the other’ to European immigrant integration
debates, which strongly relates to the securitization of
this policy field and the simultaneous regulation of Is-
lamic religion within it (Cesari, 2009). Second, there is
a widespread acceptance that liberalism has become a
cornerstone of the ‘us’ that collective identities refer to
(Triadafilopoulos, 2011). The uniting element we can ob-
serve in most European integration policies of recent
years is a postulated value consensus among the estab-
lished population (Adamson, Triadafilopoulos, & Zolberg,
2011). This consensus is mostly presented as building
on a set of liberal norms and the upholding of human
rights. Conversely, the addressees of immigrant integra-
tion policies are characterized as not having internalized
this set of norms (yet). This characterization of an out-
group, marked by illiberal ideas (or the insufficient sup-
port of liberal ones) happens concurrently with conceiv-
ing immigrant populations as Muslims.
On the other hand, a renewed emphasis on Christian-
ity has been observed by several authors but is rarely dis-
cussed more closely. Tariq Modood views this new em-
phasis as a ‘response to the challenge of multicultural-
ism’ in the light of ‘the primacy given to religion as the ba-
sis of identity, organization, political representation, nor-
mative justification, etc.’ (2012, pp. 139–140). The prob-
lematization of Muslims is—as demonstrated by Riem
Spielhaus (2011)—not self-evident, nor is it simply re-
lated to the presence of believers. Equally, I suggest, the
new emphasis on Christianity cannot be viewed as a self-
evident reaction to the presence of Muslims in Europe
and the primacy that is given to Islam. It is perfectly pos-
sible to encounter a religiously defined other with a non-
religious line of argument.
Liberalism is however, insufficient to promote a spe-
cific national identity, as the universal character of lib-
eral norms limits their scope to build a collective identity
on particularistic elements (Joppke, 2008, p. 536). Chris-
tian Joppke therefore concludes that the new emphasis
on Christianity is an attempt to capture a particularis-
tic identity element (2008, p. 540). This is unconvincing:
a Christian collective identity is neither particularistic—
Christianity is not French, Austrian or German, it is just
not Muslim—nor easily combined with liberal norms.
Joppke addresses this issue in a later paper by calling
Christianity and liberalism ‘different words for the same
thing observed over time’ and attesting the term Chris-
tian to function as ‘a code word for national particular-
ism’ (2013, p. 612). This ignores not only the vital theoret-
ical debate about the relation of Christianity and Liberal-
ism (Dombrowski, 2014; Gillespie, 2014; Laborde, 2013;
Maffettone, 2014), but also the lively diversity of reli-
gious and secular political positions that exist within Eu-
rope and compete in many policy fields. In a way, this ap-
proach also contributes to the simplifying dichotomy of
‘good religion/bad religion’ many authors speak of, when
religion is endorsed by state actors as long as it is useful
to their own agenda (Wilson & Mavelli, 2014, p. 19).
Rather than viewing the new emphasis on Christian-
ity just as a quasi-automatic response to the challenge
of multiculturalism, as a search for particularistic iden-
tity elements of disoriented liberal states or even a reli-
gious conflict between Islam and Christianity, I suggest
understanding it as the result of a contested process of
competing sets of possible identity elements. The new
emphasis on Christianity is primarily the expression of a
political struggle for the power to define features of col-
lective identity.
I will argue that Christian-democratic parties are push-
ing for this new emphasis on Christianity to solve their
internal dilemma with proximity and distance to religion.
Parties of the radical right use anti-Islamic ideas to pro-
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mote a nationalist and exclusionary notion of ‘us’. Social-
democratic policy-makers have the tendency to disregard
the role of religion (and culture) for immigrant integra-
tion (Laurence, 2013), instead focusing on socio-political
aspects as markers for equality and difference (Scheffer,
2011). Christian-democratic parties, however, are seen as
traditionally concerned with ‘philosophical, ethical and,
in a broader sense cultural issues’ (Dierickx, 1994, p. 17).
4. Immigrant Integration, Religion and
Christian-Democrats in Austria and Germany
Immigrant integration programs from Austria and Ger-
many are the empirical basis for this case study on reli-
gion as a marker for self- and otherness. The two coun-
tries share similar migration histories and resemble each
other in their approach towards integration (Koopmans,
2005). Up until the 1990s, despite significant histories
of immigration, politicians in both Germany and Aus-
tria widely refused to identify their country as a coun-
try of immigration. Like other countries that installed
guest worker regimes, Germany and Austria neglected
badly needed integration policies for long-term residency.
Rather, measures were limited to the labour market
while return migration was equally fostered (Bommes &
Kolb, 2012). Not until the turn of the millennium did inte-
gration issues finally climb up on the governmental politi-
cal agenda. Comprehensive and systematic development
of integration policy in Germany began after 2005 un-
der a grand coalition government. Similar efforts at na-
tional level in Austria only started in 2008 (for a detailed
overview of both countries immigrant integration policy
development see Zincone, Penninx, & Borkert, 2011). The
empirical analysis focuses on this period in which immi-
grant integration became a more closely defined and ac-
tively addressed policy field in both states.
Over the period of this project, Christian-democratic
parties shaped both countries’ immigrant integration
policies. For Austria, it can be reasonably assumed that
it was primarily the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) that
shaped outputs from 2000 onwards: Holding the rele-
vant office (Ministry of Interior until 2011, State Secre-
tariat for Integration from 2011 to 2013) can be seen as
exceptionally influential in that particular policy field. In
Germany during the empirical study period (2005–2009),
Christian Democratic Union (CDU) held the governmen-
tal offices in charge of immigrant integration policy (Min-
istry of Interior, Federal Chancellery). Therefore this pa-
pers’ findings are also limited to this party family.
Religion is a contested issue within those parties. In
Germany, this became particularly evident during the
‘Leitkultur’ debate from 2000/01 onwards (Manz, 2004).
This debate, in which CDU politicians picked up a term
coined by the political scientist Bassam Tibi (1998), ad-
dressed the role of Christianity for collective identity. This
was also contested within the party and it became one of
manyoccasionswhen themeaningof the ‘C’ in theparty’s
name was discussed controversially. German Chancellor
Angela Merkel emphasized the importance of Christian-
ity in various contexts, from demanding migrants to ‘ac-
cept’ Christian values (Der Spiegel, 2010) to the call on
young party members to be more ‘excited’ about their
Christian beliefs (Schwarze, 2010). The role of religion for
and within the Austrian ÖVP is also ambivalent but less
openly debated. When the party was re-established af-
ter WorldWar II, they did not call themselves Christian to
address a wider electorate and to demonstrate distance
to the pre-war experience of Catholic authoritarianism
(Binder, 2001). Throughout its post-war history, empha-
sizing conservative values and the role of Christianity was
frequently used to counter criticism on neoliberal eco-
nomic policies (Müller, 2014, p. 245).
Concerning state-religion relations, Austria and Ger-
many are classified as ‘systems of shared tasks’ (Minken-
berg, 2002), characterized by the exclusive collaboration
of state institutions and religious communities acknowl-
edged in law. These selected communities enjoy tax ben-
efits, state-funded religious education in public schools,
special legal protection and other privileges. In Austria,
the Catholic Church is in a particularly dominant position.
Over sixty per cent of the Austrian population are mem-
bers of this church and Christianity is granted an out-
standing role in the public sphere (e.g. crucifixes in class-
rooms). Because of its history as a multi-ethnic empire,
Austria officially recognized Islam in 1912, following the
annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. A state-recognized Is-
lamic religious community was then established in 1979,
long before Islam became a politicized issue. Many as-
pects of institutional embedding which are disputed in
other European countries are regulated and not very con-
tentious (Mattes & Rosenberger, 2015).
More than Austria, Germany is characterized by a dis-
tinct internalization of intra-Christian religious pluralism.
Two Christian churches of almost equal size (Catholic
and Protestant) dominate the religious landscape and,
similar to Austria, enjoy the status of statutory bodies
under public law. The state recognition of Islamic com-
munities is a contentious issue that is not limited to re-
ligion politics but closely related to immigrant integra-
tion. The German Islam Conference (Deutsche Islamkon-
ferenz, DIK) was established in 2006 to address both the
institutional embedding of Islamic religious communities
and the integration of Muslims in Germany (Rosenow-
Williams, 2012). Participants included state authorities,
Muslim representatives and individuals, as well as ex-
perts from academia and practice. In the course of the
DIK it became clear that the initial hope for state recog-
nition held by Islamic associations was only a distant
prospect. While the DIK was at first scheduled as a three-
year process, itsmandatewas renewed for the third time
in 2014.
5. Methods and Material
Immigrant integration policies from Austria and Ger-
many build a case in which processes of boundary
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drawing on religion can be identified. The empirical
work builds on a qualitative content analysis of immi-
grant integration policy documents. Two central research
questions where addressed: 1) How are different reli-
gions constructed in immigrant integration policies? and
2) What is the relationship between these constructions
and the collective identity promoted in immigrant inte-
gration policies? As immigrant integration policies de-
veloped at different tempos, it is more accurate to in-
vestigate periods surrounding a key event than choos-
ing a concrete time span. The period of analysis starts
with the initial development of national policy strate-
gies and is limited to one term in office of the respec-
tive government. This allows to investigate a timespan
in which most influential factors stayed constant and var-
ied party strength did not affect policy outputs. German
integration policy programs analysed cover the period
between November 2005 and October 2009, Austrian
policies were analysed from December 2008 to Novem-
ber 2013. During these periods, each government issued
eight major documents (see Table 1) covered in this anal-
ysis. The datamaterial also includes selected information
material, campaigns and press releases that explicitly ad-
dress the issue of collective identity.
In the initial round of coding, text passages that draw
on religion in the context of collective identity have been
identified. A coding scheme, derived from relevant liter-
ature on symbolic boundary formation (Alba, 2005; Bail,
2008; Korteweg & Yurdakul, 2014; Lamont & Molnár,
2002; Wimmer, 2013) was used to perform a qualitative
content analysis using semi-structured coding (Mayring,
2008). The coding of categorization practices (‘defining
relevant groups’ and ‘defining who belongs’, Wimmer,
2013, p. 46) and types of boundaries (as discussed above)
allowed for the identification of recurrent elements. Af-
ter several rounds of coding, clusters of similarly struc-
tured elements were identified, out of which three pat-
terns of relating religion to collective identity emerged.
6. Analysis and Discussion: Three Patterns of Religion
as a Symbolic Boundary
Below I will present and discuss three patterns of reli-
gion as a symbolic boundary identified in the empirical
case study. Direct quotes from the data material (trans-
lated by the author) are used to exemplify the results
of the analysis. The subsequent discussion focusses on
Christian-democratic parties as drivers of the observed
emphasis on Christianity that mostly occurs in relation
to Islam. Other minority religions by contrast, are hardly
ever referred to in the policy documents analysed.
6.1. Muscular Liberalism
This first pattern is particularly relevant because it is
not an alternative to the other patterns identified, but
mostly works as an underlying structure. The categoriza-
tion practice in this pattern defines the majority as uni-
fied by liberal values. Here, religion is not a feature of
collective identity. The out-group by contrast is named
as Muslims, marked by lacking willingness or ability to
implement liberal norms.
‘[I]t is important to communicate Austrian fundamen-
tal values and rights and install a sense of belong-
ing among Muslims.’ (Bundesministerium für Inneres
[BMI], 2012, p. 24)
Patterns like this have been discussed in the literature
referring to ‘muscular liberalism’, which is based on the
idea ‘that it is the business of a liberal state to produce
liberal individuals and promote a liberal way of life’ (Mod-
ood, 2012, p. 143). Muscular Liberalism is not necessar-
ily linked to religion and can be found in both Germany
and Austria. In Germany, however, this pattern is most
common in the context of the DIK. Muslim representa-
tives had to profess their commitment to liberal norms
throughout the process. The location of these claims of
muscular liberalism in the context of the DIK links ques-
tions of shared values structurally to religion and to Islam
in particular. Identity narratives are rarely found in gen-
eral integration policy documents, while ‘collective iden-
tity and shared values’ is one of four core subjects of the
DIK, almost like an outsourcing of value debates.
The boundary drawnhere does not demarcate a clear
in-group. Liberal is the only attribute themajority shares;
no categories of difference are applied. The out-group
however, is described as ‘Muslims’ and characterized as
illiberal. This limits the possibilities of boundary crossing
to individual positional moves. A formal ‘commitment
to the value system’ by Muslim representatives is re-
quested to allow for boundary blurring and the accep-
tance of the former mutually exclusive combination of
‘liberal’ and ‘Muslim’: Still, as the following statement
from German National Integration Plan shows, bound-
aries might be uphold despite a given commitment:
‘[T]he committee pointed out that it is now crucial to
connect the given commitment to the value system of
the Basic Law to issues of everyday life, such as equal-
ity of men and women and unlimited school atten-
dance of children from Muslim families.’ (Deutsche
Bundesregierung, 2007, p. 207)
6.2. Christian Ancestry
Within the ‘Christian Ancestry’ pattern, doubts about the
extent to which Muslims are able or willing to accept
liberal and secular structures are opposed with the con-
struction of both secularism and liberalism as a histori-
cal product of Christianity and therefore insolubly linked.
This takes two forms:
In the first argument, Christianity is given an active
role in the promoted collective identity as secular struc-
tures are attributed to this religion.
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Table 1. Overview data material.
Austria Germany
2006 — ‘Declaration of Intent’,
Pressreleasesand
cam
paigns
byM
inistryofInterior,
FederalChancellery
— Federal Government
— Opening Declaration of the
— German Islam Conference
2007 —National Integration Plan
2008 — Expert Analysis on Integration Pressreleasesand
cam
paigns
byM
inistryofInterior
— National Integration Plan,
— ‘Gemeinsam kommen wir zusammen’ — 1st Progress Report
— German Islam Conference,
— 3rd Plenum Report
2009 — Survey ‘Integration in Austria’ — ‘Three years German Islam
— Conference’
— German Islam Conference,
— 4th Plenum Report
— Survey ‘Muslim Life in Germany’
2010 —National Action Plan for Integration
2011 —Work Program Experts Council Integration
— Annual Progress report on the National Pressreleasesand
cam
paignsbyState
Secretariatfor
Integration
— Action Plan for Integration
2012 — Annual Progress report on the National
— Action Plan for Integration
— Report on the Dialogue Forum Islam
2013 — Annual Progress Report on the National
— Action Plan for Integration
‘The German legal framework for the relation be-
tween the state and religious communities devel-
oped in the historical confrontation with Christian
churches.’ (DIK, 2009, p. 264)
The historical role of Christian churches is applied as a
boundary against Islam in the context of the DIK. Contin-
uous references to the historic role of Christian churches
in the development of a secular state order portray Chris-
tianity as a religion that is already fulfilling such secu-
lar standards and has even co-founded them. Islam is
viewed as opposed to these values. This relates to Ta-
lal Asad’s view on secularism, as the effect of heteroge-
neous power relations, rather than as a substantial con-
cept. As he argues, certain constructions of the secular
are reproduced against Muslims, constructing them as
‘external to the essence of Europe’ (2003, p. 151).
In the second argument that works within this pat-
tern, the description of Muslims as potential danger to
liberal values is contrastedwith the construction of these
universal ideas as derived from Christianity and there-
fore essentially linked to it. Here universal values are por-
trayed as derived from Christian scriptures, Christian the-
ology or Christian ethics, and the normative foundations
of contemporary Europe are attributed to Christianity.
An example for such boundary construction can
be found in the preamble of an early Austrian policy
program:
‘The following discussion will show that the prob-
lem of integrating foreigners predominantly concerns
members of the Islamic culture, to a lesser extent also
those of other (for example African or Asian) cultures.’
(BMI, 2008, p. 18)
This statement is followed by a discussion of ‘Austrian
values’, a listing of liberal norms. On the basic principle
of equality the document states:
‘The principle of equality derives from statements of
the Old and especially the New Testament, that all
men are equal before God.’ (BMI, 2008, p. 20)
Despite a reference to the French Revolution as another
source for the principle of equality that follows this state-
ment, a binary opposition is constructed between lib-
eral democracy, which is portrayed as a result of Chris-
tian belief, as part of ‘us’, and a certain idea of Islam,
which is characterized by its non-compatibility with uni-
versal norms. Both membership and non-membership
are defined on religious grounds. However, only few
paragraphs in the analysed material are so illiberal in
character. In general, references to Christianity are more
carefully embedded in the discussion of collective val-
ues and identity. This quote from then Minister of
the Interior in Germany, Wolfgang Schäuble, expresses
this development:
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‘[W]e have expectations of Muslims. Following the
German legal and moral order, we understand the
way towards a thriving coexistence as a process in
which cultural and religious differences have to be
acknowledged, but also in which the complete ac-
ceptance of liberal-democratic basic principles is re-
quired as a precondition….Within this order—which is
shaped by Christian ethics, this has to be said—Islam
has to find its place.’ (DIK, 2009, p. 15)
In different forms, this pattern of boundary drawing sub-
sumes the construction of a Christian ancestry to which
Islam and Muslims, as the other, are opposed. Christian-
ity, Christian norms or Christian ethics are portrayed as
a cultural tradition or a heritage, rather than an actual
religion. Joppke calls this a ‘demotion of “religion” to the
status of “culture”’. In Joppke’s argument this promotion
of religion through a demotion to culture makes it less of
a violation of the neutrality mandate liberal democratic
states ought to hold (2013, p. 606). While Christianity is
treated as a cultural element, it is debateable to what ex-
tent this treatment is a demotion and not just a decoy or
even an enhancement. It builds on the pattern of muscu-
lar liberalism that merges with a ‘neutralized’ Christian-
ity. This only relates to a historic development but lacks
any reference to believers, churches or religious prac-
tice. Tariq Modood speaks of a ‘secular Christian’, ‘anal-
ogous to the term ‘secular Jew’ to describe someone of
Jewish descent who has a sense of Jewish identity but
is not religiously practicing and may even be an atheist’
(2012, p. 142).
Yet this apparently secular Christianity functions to
keep Islam outside of the bright boundary of collective
identity. More than in the pattern of muscular liberalism,
this boundary defines members of the in-group. Com-
pared to the pattern of muscular liberalism, this is a con-
tracting boundary shift as membership is now defined
narrower as determined by Christian ancestry.
6.3. Universal Religion
In this pattern unwanted, illiberal and radical behaviour
is attributed to ‘wrongly understood’ religion (then State
Secretary for Integration in Austria Sebastian Kurz in
Kathpress, 2011) as opposed to a universal religion that
reinforces liberal values. No longer is Islam explicitly
the marker for an out-group and Christianity the in-
group characteristic but a religious community (‘we’)
is opposed by illiberal people who misinterpret reli-
gious concepts.
This pattern of boundary drawing is particularly
prominent in Austrian policy documents, e.g. in the state-
ment below from the 2011 Integration Report:
‘A major factor in the integration debate is the ques-
tion of religious practice….For acknowledged religious
communities, there is a need to examine how privi-
leges granted by the state can be utilized to support
integration and in turn to impede or avoid behaviour,
which is not in accordance with the constitutional
laws, under the “cloak” of religion.’ (Staatssekretariat
für Integration, 2011, p. 13)
Religion, portrayed as generally positive and compatible
with universal norms, is differentiated frompractices and
beliefs described as happening ‘under the cloak of reli-
gion’. Overall the positive evaluation of religion’s ability
to promote values comes to the fore, as in the following
quote from Sebastian Kurz, on the topic of (Islamic) reli-
gious education in public schools:
‘I believe that religion is very important to people in
principle, that values are something important and re-
ligion is a good approach to examining personal fun-
damental values.’ (Die Presse, 2011)
This involvement of universal religion in immigrant inte-
gration is even recommended to influence other policy
fields:
‘The Expert Council for Integration recommends a
broad discussion among state actors, researchers and
religious authorities about the role of religion in the
public and private spheres. The findings of this pro-
cess should not only influence religious education and
ethics lessons in school, but should also be reflected
in labour law, regional development and other legal
issues.’ (BMI, 2013, pp. 25–26)
This pattern of boundary drawing on religious grounds is
an enhancement of religion. ‘Universal religion’ as part
of the collective identity promotes a shared value basis in
which the religious, not the secular, is seen as universal.
My usage of this term draws on Lori Beaman’s concept
of the ‘will to religion’. Here she discusses a more gen-
eral trend towards increasing the relevance of religion in
various aspects of public life and its consequences. Bea-
man describes universal religion as ‘Christianity’s trans-
mutation as representing universal values’, able to in-
clude a spectrum of religious traditions but remaining
‘fundamentally Christian in its shape’ (2013, pp. 149–
151). While this opens up a possibility for the inclusion
of Islam, at the same time it raises the questions of how
to assess whether a religion is understood wrongly or
rightly and who would be entitled to make this decision.
Although integration policy documents do not name
concrete examples, critical assessment of religion—as,
for example, the Dialogue Forum Islam and its working
group on ‘gender relations’, which aims to ‘strengthen
women’s roles in community work’ (BMI, 2013)—is lim-
ited to Islam and never involves illiberal aspects of Chris-
tianity. Islam and Christianity are not constructed in op-
position but religion in general is understood as a posi-
tive, even necessary, part of Austrian society. A bound-
ary is drawn between a collective identity of which re-
ligion is a central feature and some vague ‘other’ char-
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acterized as incompatible with liberal norms and ‘under
the cloak of religion’. We can understand universal reli-
gion as a boundary expansion: through an emphasis shift,
it is no longer Islam in general that is associated with il-
liberal and therefore outgroup-characteristics but ‘mis-
conceived religion’. The boundary that is maintained—
the demarcation of misconceived religion, characterized
as illiberal and problematic—is clearly used to address
(some) Muslims.
All three identified patterns of boundary drawing
(see Table 2) can be observed in both Germany and
Austria, yet they are unequally distributed between the
cases. In Germany, many integration policy documents
avoid addressing collective identity and common values
beyond references to the Basic Law as a set of univer-
sal norms. This focus on the constitution as a point of
reference for collective identity, which is much less com-
mon in Austrian documents, brings to mind the concept
of ‘constitutional patriotism’ (Habermas, 1991; Stern-
berger, 1990). Unlike the Austrian constitution, the his-
toric development of the German Basic Law holds a sig-
nificantmeaning for post-war German society (Kommers,
2012). Instead, the German debate on collective identity
is mainly outsourced to the Islam Conference and there-
fore structurally connected to religion. The out-group
here becomes defined a priori by the specific setting.
Themuscular liberalism pattern, whereby a boundary be-
tween liberal values and Muslims as an illiberal other is
drawn, can be found within the DIK documents and be-
yond. The Christian ancestry pattern, which connects the
liberal self to Christianity by ‘secularizing’ it, is also com-
mon in German policy documents and in particular in DIK
documents or general documents that refer to the DIK.
The opposite is true of Austrian policy documents. The
muscular liberalism pattern is as common as in German
documents, although it is not expressed through refer-
ences to the constitution.While Christian ancestry is less
present than in German documents, the pattern of uni-
versal religion characterizes Austrian immigrant integra-
tion policy documents of the study period. This might be
related to the relatively active role of religion that can
be found in Austria beyond the field of immigrant inte-
gration policies (Avramopoulou, Çorbacioğlu, & Sanna,
2012; Mattes & Rosenberger, 2015).
6.4. Two Christian-Democratic Parties Resolving a
Common Dilemma?
While differences between Austria and Germany are
small, the similarities are striking. A new emphasis on
Christianity, in form of Christian ancestry and universal
religion has been observed in both countries. As actors
behave strategically to shape boundaries in their inter-
est (Wimmer, 2013, p. 205) I want to discuss the particu-
lar strategies of Christian-democratic policy-makers, who
shaped the immigrant integration programs analysed.
Historically, Christian-democratic parties emerged
somewhat in conflict with the political system they op-
erated in and often functioned ‘as interest groups within
a system whose legitimacy the church continued to re-
ject’ (Müller, 2014). Early Catholic parties were not in
favour of the democratic development of European na-
tion states. Obviously, this anti-democratic attitude has
given way to a positive assessment of the modern lib-
eral state and is no longer a characteristic of today’s
Christian-democratic parties. The shift to a democratic
and more liberal political orientation happened at the
expense of a narrow Christian (Catholic) agenda (Van
Hecke & Gerard, 2004, p. 316). Early on in their history,
Christian-democratic parties experienced close ties to
the Catholic Church as restraining. Not only did the influ-
ence of church officials constrain political margins, but
the parties’ confessional character also narrowed their
potential electorate. Christian-democratic parties found
Table 2. Patterns of religion as a symbolic boundary.
In-group Who Out-group Who Type of Potential of
characteristics belongs to characteristics belongs to boundary boundary
in-group? out-group? crossing
Muscular liberalism liberal values undefined illiberal Muslims (potentially) collective:
majority blurred commitment?
individual:
assimilation
Christian ancestry liberal values, secular and illiberal Muslims bright, collective and
determined by Christian contracted individual:
Christian history majority assimilation
liberal values,
determined by
Christian theology
Universal religion values determined religious illiberal, ‘under (some) bright, collective and
by religions as majority the cloak of Muslims expanded individual:
moral authorities religion’ dissociation
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themselves in what Stathis Kalyvas calls ‘the confessional
dilemma’ and had to figure out ‘how to escape from the
constraints of their confessional origins while maintain-
ing a distinctive identity’ (1996, p. 223).
The role of Christianity for today’s Christian-demo-
cratic parties is ambivalent and subject to intense in-
ternal and external debate. As Andreas Wagner demon-
strates, traditional Christian positions on economic poli-
cies (aiming at a Christian understanding of a so-
cial market economy), welfare (oriented on the male-
breadwinner model) or sexuality and gender (e.g. in
opposition to gay rights) are controversial even within
Christian democratic parties (2014, pp. 211–213). Nowa-
days, these parties mostly combine groups with differ-
ent, more liberal, conservative or strictly Christian prefer-
ences. Calls for a stronger focus on Christianity—or even
just for a reflection on religious foundations—are regu-
larly heard. The central objection against this is the un-
popularity of traditional religious arguments for an elec-
torate increasingly unaffiliated to religion (Florin, 2014).
The historical internal dilemma of Christian-demo-
cratic parties—to successfully combine a Christian iden-
tity with a liberal democratic setting—is highly topical
today. Within the field of immigrant integration, how-
ever, this dilemma seems to be dissolved by promoting a
collective identity that interweaves Christianity with lib-
eral norms against an equally religiously defined other.
While religion was always an explicit part of Christian-
democratic ideology, the extent to which it was high-
lighted and communicated varied. Unlike in other pol-
icy fields, the emphasis on Christianity is hardly con-
tested here. Apparently, the outsourcing of a broader
value debate to the field of immigrant integration allows
Christian-democratic policymakers to both solve their in-
ternal dilemma and position a collective identity narra-
tive clearly associated with their parties.
7. Conclusion
To conclude, I want to go back to the rhetorical question
I raised at the beginning: Are we all Christian, are we all
secular, are we all liberal or are we just white? Analysing
the construction of religions as symbolic boundaries has
allowed assessing the role of religion in the collective
identities promoted in German and Austrian immigrant
integration policies. To start with the obvious: This analy-
sis supports the well-established claim that liberal norms
are a strong, if not the central, element that European
collective identities draw on in the context of immi-
grant integration. The investigated policies correspond
to the notion of muscular liberalism as described in
the literature. Promoted collective identities are essen-
tially liberal.
Regarding the questionwhether this liberal collective
identity is Christian or secular in character, the analysis
found both. As references to religion were the central fo-
cus of this study, notions of identity that draw on secu-
larism were not analysed systematically. Here lies great
potential for further research that relates theoretical de-
bates on conceptualizations of the secular (e.g. Warner,
Van Antwerpen, & Calhoun, 2010) to an empirical anal-
ysis of collective identity constructions. The focus on re-
ligion in this empirical analysis, though, clearly showed
that Christian and secular values are not set in contra-
diction, which results in the notion of a ‘Christian sec-
ular’. If this, as Tariq Modood suggests, is an emerging
identity that is Christian but not related to religious prac-
tice, the answer to the question if the observed collective
identity is Christian or secular is: it is both. Taking into
account the observed promotion of a universal religion
somewhat changes the picture. Here a vital religiousness,
not exclusively limited to Christianity, is promoted and re-
sults in a marginalization of the secular and the question
becomes even less answerable within the limited scope
of this study. These dynamics warrant further compara-
tive research on a larger scale, in particular among coun-
tries with distinct experiences in terms of religion-state
relations and party political settings.
Together the observed boundaries build a clear hier-
archical order based on religion, establishing a superior-
ity of Christianity as marker of Europeanness over Islam
as the illiberal other. This analysis shows that religion—
both Christianity and Islam—is used to uphold difference.
Muslims are constructed as inferior to Christianity and
the ‘truly’ European populations produced by it. This sup-
ports Fatima El-Tayeb’s argument of Muslim as a racial-
ized category.
The way Christianity gets linked to secular structures,
liberal norms and their transmission merges Christian-
ity and the structural and normative foundations of Aus-
trian, German and European societies. Within immigrant
integration policies, the contradictions between those
ideologies are argumentatively eliminated, often even
reversed. The Christian-democratic policymakers who
shaped those policies did not aim to promote a Chris-
tian identity instead of a liberal one but seem to have
succeeded in equating the primarily liberal collective
identities promoted within immigrant integration poli-
cies with Christianity.
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